

VALUE CHANGE IN NEW EASTERN EUROPE

In this chapter you will learn:

- what “values” and “value orientations” are and how they are studied in sociology;
- what values and value orientations are predominant in NEE and how they are different from highly individualized European countries in the spheres of economy, politics, morals, work, and family, and
- how values have changed since 1990 in eastern European societies as compared to western Europe.

Introduction

Values are guiding ideas about a desirable state of life that carry strong personal and/or social meaning as they get interiorized during the socialization period. Indeed, “values link individuals to a wider society” (Zdravomyslov, 1999:258). People pick up from different social goals, attitudes, and patterns, which are treated as being prior to people, and pursue them in their behaviour (Lobanova & Chutova, 2009). “Core values” are terminal or goal-setting, which means that they are the fundament of individual’s ideas about life. Values that are not much or not always important are said to be instrumental values lying “at the value periphery” (Lapin, 1994). Human behaviour cannot be explained solely by a set of values, but in most cases value orientations, that is practical preferences between values, are relatively good predictors of individuals’ opinions and reactions.

It may be not obvious that values vary widely across societies. Like culture, values do not recognize state borders, so that whole value maps of the world can be drawn. In addition, values can change during periods of social transformations, for example, as a result of industrialization, urbanization, or democratization. Patterns of value change may be similar across cultures and countries, but this should not overlook cross-cultural or cross-national differences, for “no two societies modernize in quite the same way - no two have the same base of resources and skills, no two have the same heritage of traditional institutions or the same policies of modernization” (Black, 1996:95).

One of the most important modernization theories implemented in value research is Ronald Inglehart’s theory of post-materialist values. Inglehart’s “post-materialism thesis” says that, once basic economic and security needs have been met in societies experiencing industrialization, value preferences defined by survival and material needs are followed by post-materialist value preferences, which primarily concern self-expression and mental well-being

(Inglehart, 1997:104). In Western societies, these changes have occurred in parallel with the fundamental shifts in attitudes and values from collectivistic (traditional, religious and familial) value orientations of pre-modern societies to the individualistic ones of modern societies.

Contrary to this, Soviet society was based on collectivist principles that praised the “collective”, the group, and narrowed down the significance of individual. When the Soviet state collapsed, new nation-states had to adapt to the new reality, and value change intensified. On the background of deep economic crisis and pauperization, materialism self-survival values rose steeply in post-Soviet societies, which went contrary to the global trend. Simultaneously, Soviet collectivism was partly abandoned, and this *change from collectivism to individualism*, which took place in the last twenty years, renders it interesting to compare values.

This Chapter presents an overview of values and value orientations in the NEE countries of Armenia, Belarus, and Ukraine. To find out the differences in the meanings of values between the countries, we compare these three post-Soviet countries of different cultural background with Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, highly individualized Western countries (see Inglehart and Welzel’s Value Map 2008¹). In what follows, firstly, we look into different models of measuring values; secondly, we analyze value orientations in the issues of economy, politics, civic and private morals; then we turn to work values and work ethos, and then proceed to family values and, finally, to the link between economic growth and value orientations.

Methodological background

There are several approaches to measuring values developed in the literature. Many authors consider values as the core concepts that define culture (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck (1961), Hofstede, 2010), Schwartz (2011)). Many of those have provided universal frameworks to compare values across cultures (for a detailed analysis see: Nardon & Steers (2009:3-11)).

The following seven models for measuring values across cultures (see Table 1) attempt to accomplish a goal: to suggest a well-reasoned set of value dimensions among which various cultures can be compared.

Table 1. Seven models for measuring values across cultures	
Models by authors	Values dimensions

¹ Inglehart, R., Welzel, C. (2005) The WVS Cultural Map of The World, Retrieved 5 June 2011 from <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54>.

Talcott Parsons & Edward Shils (2001) [1951]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ affectivity vs. affective neutrality; ➤ self- vs. collectivity orientation; ➤ universalism vs. particularism; ➤ ascription vs. achievement; ➤ specificity vs. diffuseness.
Fred Kluckhohn & Florence Strodtbeck (1961)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ relationship with nature (humans dominant - harmony with nature - dominant) ➤ relationship with people (individual –collateral - lineal) ➤ human activities (doing – becoming - being) ➤ relationship with time (past – present - future) ➤ human nature (good – mixed - evil)
Milton Rokeach (1973)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ instrumental values ➤ terminal values
Geert Hofstede (1995)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ power distance ➤ collectivism – individualism ➤ femininity – masculinity ➤ uncertainty avoidance ➤ short-term or long-term orientation ➤ indulgence - restraint
Charles Hampden-Turner & Fons Trompenaars (1986)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ universalism vs. particularism ➤ individualism vs. collectivism (communitarianism) ➤ achievement vs. ascription ➤ neutral vs. affective ➤ specific vs. diffuse ➤ human-time relationship ➤ human-nature relationship
Shalom Schwartz (2011) [1990]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ openness to change: stimulation, self-direction ➤ conservation: security, tradition, conformity ➤ self-enhancement: achievement, power, hedonism. ➤ self-transcendence: universalism, benevolence
Ronald Inglehart (1997)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ materialist – post-materialist ➤ traditional - secular-rational

Cultural anthropologists Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961) suggested one of the earliest models of culture. They argued that there are a limited number of problems common to all human groups, for which there exist a limited number of solutions. They further suggested that values in every society are distributed in a way that creates a dominant value system. Rokeach (Rokeach, 1973) developed a cognitive perspective on the nature of values and created a value-measurement instrument for understanding what values are, what people value and what is the ultimate purpose of values. His model consists of 18 terminal and 18 instrumental values.

Terminal values are: a comfortable life, social recognition, equality, true friendship, an exciting life, wisdom, family security, a world at peace, freedom, a world of beauty, health,

pleasure, inner harmony, salvation, mature love, self-respect, national security, and a sense of accomplishment.

Instrumental values are: ambitious, independent, broad-minded, intellectual, capable, logical, clean, loving, courageous, loyal, forgiving, obedient, helpful, polite, honest, responsible, imaginative, self-controlled (Rokeach, 1973:27).

Hofstede's model is based on the assumption that different cultures can be distinguished by four (later - six) dimensions (Hofstede, 2010). Those are: power distance (PDI), collectivism - individualism (IDV), femininity - masculinity (MAS), uncertainty avoidance (UAI), short-term or long-term orientation (LTE), indulgence – restraint.

Basing on Hofstede as well as Parsons and Shils, Trompenaars (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1997) created his own model that focuses on variations in values and personal relationships across cultures.


Shalom Schwartz (2011) argues that the essential distinction between “societal values” is the motivational goals they express. The author identifies ten universal human values that reflect needs, social motives, and social institutional demands.

Lately, some versions of Schwartz's model were integrated into the European Social Survey and in World Values Survey, the biggest and most comprehensive value study project to date (led by R. Inglehart and C. Welzel). Inglehart's theory suggests looking at changes in value orientations in two dimensions (Inglehart, 1997). The horizontal dimension describes the value shift from “survival values”, which can be explained as materialistic (economic survival, physical security), to “self-expression values” explained as ‘post-materialistic’ (such as subjective well-being or environmental awareness). The vertical dimension includes a pole of “traditional values” (importance of parent-child ties and deference to traditional family values) and a pole of “secular-rational values” (decreasing importance of religion). The author argues that modernization and economic growth lead to cultural diversity with a promotion of religious freedom, but modernization also leads to a higher level of life and existential security, which finally brings about a religious decline.

One of the core phenomena of societal change that we look at in this Chapter is *individualization*, which refers to the process when the individual increasingly becomes the point of reference in people's shaping of own values and attitudes. In post-industrial societies, social significance of traditional institutions declines, and the individual gains importance in determining what is good or bad, right or wrong. In referring to the concept of individualization, we look at the level by which individuals in highly individualized European countries and in post-Soviet countries see themselves as personally responsible for their living, behaviour and lifestyles.

General Overview

If we take a look at what values are generally important for people, we see a lot of similarity across countries, in individualized Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland (NSS) and in post-Soviet Armenia, Belarus, and Ukraine alike (see Graph 1).



Graph 1. Importance of values (Armenia, Belarus, Ukraine, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland-NSS).

Source: EVS 2008.

The most important values for people in all the countries are family, work, and friends. However, religion is generally more important in NEE countries, rather than in Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, the highly individualized European countries (see Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).

Changing Values in Economy

Many value debates have evolved around the foundational principles of economy: Should individuals be able to rely on the state in case of necessity? Should there be more public goods or more private property? All these features make national economies different from each other.

Soviet economy, like all Socialist economies, was based on the principle of redistribution of goods, so that more people could theoretically benefit from the economic growth. Alternative to the Socialist economy is the neoliberal model that posits, first of all, the individual's

responsibility for his or her personal well-being. This model was widely introduced in Russia and NEE states in the 1990s when one-moment “shock therapy” economic reforms took place. For the NEE countries, the main economic issue has been to find a new model that balances personal and state share in economy after the breakdown of the Soviet economy. The values of competition and economic freedom or, vice versa, state regulation and redistribution, can be measured by **value orientations** in the following alternatives:

1. “Incomes should be made more equal” or “We need larger income differences as incentives”;
 2. “Government ownership of business should be increased” or “Private ownership of business should be increased”;
 3. “The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” or “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves”;
 4. “Competition is harmful. It brings the worst in people” or “Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas”.
- Source: WVS integrated 1981-2008 questionnaire.

The average of meanings in four questions on economy provide one index of collectivist or individualist value orientations in economy.

The countries of new eastern Europe, when compared with Norway, Sweden and Switzerland (NSS), demonstrate a similar value pattern, both in 1990s and in 2008 (Table 2). In the 1990s-2000s, individualist orientations have grown only slightly in NEE, while NSS have demonstrated substantial growth in economic individualism.

Country	mid-1990 ^b		2008 ^c	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Armenia	.02	.4	.12	.4
Belarus	-.01	.4	.18	.4
Norway	-.19	.3	.24	.4
Sweden	-.35	.3	.21	.4
Switzerland	-.37	.4	.21	.3
Ukraine	.00	.5	.11	.4
NEE	.00	.4	.14	.4
NSS	-.30	.4	.22	.4

^a Opinions vary from -1 to 1, where -1 means “more state in economy” and 1 means “more individual in economy”.

^b 1500-equilibrated samples.

^c Weighted samples.

Source: WVS 1994-1996; EVS 2008.

The table shows that in the 1990s, people in NEE countries held more individualist orientations than in western European countries. For a major part, this was a manifestation of their drive for individual economic freedoms and of the rollback from the (failed) collectivist Soviet economy.

In the 2000s, the score of individualism in economy has levelled off across the countries due to a rise in NSS. This means that people in NEE countries have not significantly changed their views on ownership, competition, or inequality since the mid-1990s. As of 2008, the level of economic individualism was the same in NEE and individualized European countries.

Changing Values in Politics

In political life, the main issue of value change in NEE has been democracy and democratic political culture. A substantial leftover of the Soviet regime, when all political life had been for decades orchestrated by the Communist Party, was that people had developed the “totalitarian consciousness”, which meant that they would rather look up to the state and its leader in fear and hope, waiting for decisions to come “from above” rather than from themselves. Political value orientations can be traced back in opinions about having a democratic political system or “a strong leader” in the respondents’ country through the following survey questions:

“I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?”

1. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.
2. Having a democratic political system.

Source: EVS 2008 Questionnaire.

The comparison demonstrates that value opinions about political regime have changed in the 1990s-2000 (see Table 3).

Table 3. Bad or Good: Opinions About Having a Strong Leader or Democracy in the Country (1990s-2000s) ^a						
Country	mid-1990s ^b			2008 ^c		
	Having a	Having a	Diff.	Having a	Having a	Diff.

	strong leader		democracy			strong leader		democracy		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Armenia	.04	.7	.40	.5	.36	-.03	.7	.59	.5	.62
Belarus	.06	.6	.33	.5	.27	.26	.6	.40	.4	.14
Norway	-.64	.5	.77	.4	1.41	-.55	.6	.74	.4	1.29
Sweden	-.43	.6	.72	.4	1.15	-.64	.5	.75	.4	1.39
Switzerland	-.32	.6	.60	.4	.92	-.41	.6	.70	.4	1.11
Ukraine	.09	.6	.29	.5	.20	.22	.7	.22	.5	.00
NEE	.06	.6	.35	.5	.29	.15	.7	.41	.5	.26
NSS	-.47	.6	.70	.4	1.17	-.53	.6	.73	.4	1.26

^a Opinions vary from -1 to 1, where -1 means “it is very bad” and 1 means “it is very good”.

^b 1500-equilibrated samples.

^c weighted samples.

Source: WVS 1994-1996; EVS 2008.

In NSS, support for democracy has been stable, as well as opposition to having a “strong leader”. In NEE countries, those have changed. Armenians’ support for a strong leader has gone down, and support for democracy has grown (yet the difference between those two is not as high as in NSS). In Ukraine, support for democracy has gone down, while support for a strong leader has grown, which is a surprising result that probably stems from disappointment with the outcomes of Orange revolution (2004-2005). In Belarus, support for democracy has grown, but support for a strong leader has grown even more, as the country has had the same President since 1994.

To sum up, NEE countries still hold much of the Soviet passion for “a strong hand” in power. The value of democracy is not growing evenly across NEE countries, despite the numerous efforts for democratization. The difference between supporting democracy and authoritarian power (see the “Diff.” column in the table) is still several times higher in NSS than in new eastern Europe.

Change in Civic Values

Everyday communication to other people is also a sphere for value change. The spread of individualism, if taken place, may have different faces: on the one hand, it is manifested by the growing importance of personal freedom of choice; on the other hand, it can be found in the individuals’ respect to each other. Relation to others is embodied in civic values and can be measured by people’s readiness to take advantage of others. This can be done by comparing opinions on the following statements.

“Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between”:

1. Claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to;
2. Avoiding a fare on public transport;
3. Cheating on taxes if you have a chance;
4. Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties.

Source: WVS integrated 1981-2008 questionnaire.

Firm disapproval of these acts indicates of a high level of civic values and strong social norms in society. Individuals with low scores on these questions are “free riders” taking advantage of others’ contribution to the social welfare; individuals with high scores are those who tend to contribute to society and not only take from it (see Table 4).

Country	mid-1990s ^b		2008 ^c	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Armenia	.54	.5	.76	.3
Belarus	.53	.4	.47	.4
Norway	.82	.2	.81	.2
Sweden	.72	.3	.69	.3
Switzerland	.77	.3	.82	.3
Ukraine	.53	.5	.72	.3
<i>NEE</i>	.53	.5	.65	.4
<i>NSS</i>	.77	.3	.78	.3

^a Opinions vary from -1 to 1, where -1 means “it is always justifiable” and 1 means “it is never justifiable.”

^b 1500-equilibrated samples.

^c Weighted samples (1087-1501 respondents).

Source: WVS 1994-1996; EVS 2008.

The Table shows that in the mid-1990s, post-Soviet NEE countries all held just about the same degree of civic values, which was lower than in individualized NSS. By 2008, the gap had narrowed due to Armenia and Ukraine. However, in Belarus, civic values have deteriorated in the 1990s-2000s. This instrumental treatment of legal and moral norms was common back in late Soviet times and included an instrumental, ‘pragmatic’ approach to law, and ‘double standards’

when many people, especially those in power, made use of public resources for their own benefit (Titarenko, 2004:148-150). Meanwhile, in 2008, Armenia and Ukraine have demonstrated the level of civic value orientations similar to that in Sweden.

Changes in Private Morals

Personal life is one of the subtlest areas of value change as it cannot be directly regulated by public institutions, but affects society on a massive scale. In particular, change in the attitudes to homosexuality, abortion, and divorce are characteristic of highly individualized societies (Inglehart 1990), being indicative of a shift to self-realization values. The survey questions measuring private morals go as follows:

“Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it can be justified, never be justified, or something in between (1 – never, 10 – always)”:

1. Homosexuality.
2. Abortion.
3. Divorce.

Source: EVS 2008 Questionnaire.

More freedom of choice in arranging the individual’s personal life creates greater individual space and causes higher individualism. The mean of restrictive or, vice versa, emancipative attitudes to these three phenomena is an effective way to see value orientations in private life (see Table 5).

Country	mid-1990s ^b		2008 ^c	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Armenia	-.40	.5	-.70	.3
Belarus	-.34	.4	-.33	.5
Norway	.04	.6	.29	.6
Sweden	.43	.5	.54	.6
Switzerland	.10	.6	.09	.6
Ukraine	-.43	.5	-.55	.4
NEE	-.39	.5	-.52	.4
NSS	.19	.6	.30	.6

^a Opinions vary from -1 to 1, where -1 means “it is never justifiable”(=restrictive values orientations) and 1 means “it is always justifiable”(=emancipative values orientations).

^b 1500-equilibrated samples.

^c Weighted samples (1090-1500 respondents).

Source: WVS 1994-1996; EVS 2008.

In the 1990s, private morals in NEE countries were much closer to the collectivist ideal of a big and strong heterosexual family than to the ideal of the emancipated individual, which was widely shared in NSS. Since then, individualized European countries have even enhanced their emancipative value orientations. As for NEE, in Belarus it has not changed much but in Armenia and Ukraine the group pressure on individual's personal life has increased. It is possible that the 1990s scores in NEE countries were relatively liberal due to the post-Soviet soul-searching of that time, while in the 2000s NEE societies have generally bounced back to their previous levels of private morals. Another factor of the recent growth of traditional family values could be the falling fertility and high mortality rates induced by the deterioration of standards of living in NEE countries after 1991. In contrast to NSS, where fertility rates decreased along with the growth of welfare state, in NEE countries family decline has been a feature of financial hardship and was, overall, treated negatively. To sum up, private values in new eastern Europe are rather restrictive towards the individual, which agrees with a low level of well-being and materialistic values. This logical connection between the level of welfare and emancipative moral values is explained by Inglehart's theory of modernization (Inglehart, 1997).

Changing Values in Work

The transformation of political and economic systems in post-Soviet countries after 1991 brought about new features in the sphere of work. After decades of state administration of work under command economy, labour relations came to the market and changed both *supply* and *demand* of the workforce (reshaping old skills, higher requirements to human resources, etc.) (Vecernik, 2003:9). More flexibility in jobs was needed, but work habits remained on large scale the same in post-Soviet countries.

For the analysis, we used the questions on job satisfaction, freedom to make decisions in the job, willingness to work until satisfied with result, stay up late to finish work, work until personal goals are accomplished, on the importance of some aspects of a job, and the importance of following instructions at work.

The empirical analysis of changes in paid employment reveals that in Armenia a higher level of unemployment (17 percent in 1997 and 2008) has brought about a higher proportion of housewives (about 20 percent in 2008), which can be explained by cultural specifics of the patriarchal society. At the same time, Armenia has the lowest level of job satisfaction (see

Table 6). Belarus demonstrates the lowest level of freedom (towards making decision in own job). In addition, in Ukraine and Armenia, the proportion of the retired is increasing as a result of population's ageing.

	Armenia		Belarus		Ukraine		Norway		Sweden		Switzerland	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Freedom	6.9	2.7	5.8	2.3	6.4	2.7	7.6	2.0	7.8	2.0	7.2	2.1
Satisfaction	5.7	2.9	6.5	2.1	7.1	2.3	8.0	1.6	7.7	1.8	8.1	1.6

^a Opinions vary from 1 to 10, where 1 means “not satisfied/no freedom” and 10 means “very satisfied/full freedom”.

^b Weighted samples.


Source: EVS 2008, “How satisfied are you with your job?” (1-dissatisfied, 10-satisfied), “How free are you to make decisions in your job?” (1-none at all, 10- a great deal)

A higher freedom of decision-making can be an indicator of a more advanced economy. The case with Armenia shows that from the late 1990s on people more readily worked until they got a satisfactory result, stayed up late to finish work and accepted work *as a personal goal* (compared to Ukraine and Belarus).

The questions regarding various personally important aspects of work illustrate striking similarities in value orientations to work between Belarus and Ukraine and their dissimilarity with Armenia.


Responsibility, learning new skills, initiative, having a say – these items are important only for one third of people in Ukraine and Belarus. These countries are similar in that respondents there desire stability and the absence of risk linked to personal initiative and responsibility for it. We can see clear distinctions between the cluster of intrinsic values of work (initiative, responsibility, meeting new people, interesting job, promotion) in Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, and the cluster of external conditions of the job preferences (job security, good hours, plus interesting job from the first cluster) in Ukraine and Belarus. Armenia is quite close to Sweden by its own estimations; however, it looks conspicuous that respondents chose most available items as their preferences.

The graphs below demonstrate shifts in value preferences in work between countries over a period of a decade (from 1996 to 2008).



Source: WVS Armenia (1997), Belarus (1996), Ukraine (1996).

Graph 2. Value preferences toward work between countries (1996, 1997)



Source: EVS 2008.

Graph 3. Value preferences toward work between countries (2008)

Similarly, in 2008, respondents from Armenia mentioned that most of the suggested items were important in a job. The difference between 1996 and 2008 refers to a higher fragmentation of opinions between the countries. Also, despite a certain increase in post-materialist values toward work, job security and good pay are still the main valuable characteristics in NEE.

The analysis confirms that remarkable changes have taken place over time in two value orientations. The values of self-realization, personal responsibility and initiative are still at the periphery of the Ukrainian and Belarusian labour consciousness, while materialistic needs have started to dominate in work in NEE countries.

Respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of several work aspects which include both expressive and instrumental attributes. The expressive orientations appear in items such as “using initiative”, “responsibility”, “achieving something”, “meeting one's abilities”, “learning new skills”, “being useful for society”, “possibility to have a say”, “meet new people”, and “an interesting job”. The instrumental orientations appear in items related to the qualities of comfort and material success. This is expressed in items like “good hours”, “generous holidays”, “good pay”, “not too much pressure”, and “good job security”.

Table 7. Expressive and instrumental work orientations in NEE countries
(mean factor scores and standard deviations)

Country	Expressive orientation				Instrumental orientation			
	1994-1999 ^a		2008 ^b		1994-1999 ^a		2008 ^b	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Armenia	.19	1.00	-.60	.90	.28	.88	-.55	.73
Belarus	-.66	.82	.26	.93	-.28	.97	-.05	.85
Ukraine	-.37	.96	.29	.97	.08	.93	-.03	.92

^a 1500-equilibrated samples.

^b Weighted samples.

Source: WVS 1996-1997; WVS, 2008.

The data show that values towards work in the value structure have changed in every NEE country. In Armenia, both orientations went down, while in Ukraine and Belarus, expressive orientations in work have risen (see Table 7).

Opinions about work ethos across six countries show most interesting results (see Appendix 1). The indicators analyzed were as follows: “To fully develop your talents you need to have a job,” “It is humiliating to receive money without having to work for it,” “People who don’t work turn lazy,” “Work is a duty towards society,” and “Work should always come first even if it means less spare time”. Norway, Sweden and Switzerland demonstrate higher difference in opinions than Armenia, Ukraine, and Belarus. In many cases, the results can be explained by previous data analyses (importance of work in life, hardworking, etc.).

To summarize, Armenians can be characterized by a high work ethos, the desire to work even if it decreases their spare time. Respondents from all three post-Soviet countries accept their job as a predictor of developing their own talents, as a duty towards other people, and as an important thing for not being a “lazy person” for the others.

Changing values in Family Life

European Values Study 2008 includes indicators that reveal the orientation toward individualism and collectivism values within the context of family life. According to the survey, clear majority of respondents in Ukraine (87 percent), Belarus (81 percent), and Armenia (94 percent), claims that family is very important in their lives. However, these data per se do not demonstrate a collectivist or individualist orientation, as the survey poses the concept of family in its general terms, making no distinction for the respondents between nuclear and extended

families (the former is associated with individualist society while the latter, with collectivist one)². In the three benchmark countries (Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) too, the predominant majority of respondents, 77 percent, say that family is very important.

Inclination toward collectivist/individualist values within the context of family life can be inferred from the nature of relations between parents and children. Triandis et al. (1988:325) argue that “in collectivist cultures, interdependence is maximized between parent and child by frequent guidance, consultation, socializing in which the children are included, and penetration into the child's private life. In individualist cultures, there is emotional detachment, independence, and privacy for the child.” EVS 2008 asked respondents to agree with one of the two opposite statements concerning children’s obligations towards parents: at one pole, the statements were typical of a society where extended families (hence interdependence between children and parents) are more likely to exist, at the other, statements typical of the realities of a society with nuclear family (hence individualist values) dominating.

More specifically, when offered to express their agreement with one of the following two statements: “*Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them*” and “*One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes,*” an absolute majority of respondents in Armenia, Ukraine, and Belarus chose the first option. Collectivist orientation of the three countries becomes more accentuated when compared with NSS with less than half of respondents giving their preference to the first statement and more than half, to the second one (see Table 8).

Table 8. ^a Love and respect toward parents		
Country	<i>Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them</i>	<i>One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behavior and attitudes</i>
Armenia	92	8
Belarus	75	25
Ukraine	92	8
NSS	39	61

^a Weighted samples.

Source: EVS 2008.

² Hofstede writes that “The child who grows up among a number of elders, peers, and juniors learns naturally to conceive of him- or herself as part of a ‘we,’ much more so than does the nuclear family child.” (2005: 86)

In addition, when asked to choose one of the following two statements: “*Adult children have the duty to provide long-term care for their parents even at the expense of their own well-being*” and “*Adult children have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their parents,*” 84 percent of respondents in Armenia, 74 in Ukraine and 67 in Belarus preferred the first statement. In the NSS countries, only 32 percent of respondents thought in a similar way with the majority of 61 percent giving their preference to the second option (see Table 9).

Country	<i>Adult children have the duty to provide long-term care for their parents even at the expense of their own well-being</i>	<i>Adult children have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their parents</i>	Neither
Armenia	84	13	3
Belarus	67	25	8
Ukraine	74	19	7
NSS	32	61	7

^a Weighted samples.

Source: EVS 2008.

Another indicator of collectivism/individualism in terms of parents/children relations can be the qualities that parents find necessary for their children to learn at an early age. For example, Hofstede writes that “In individualist cultures, parents will be proud if children at an early age take small jobs in order to earn pocket money of their own, which they alone can decide how to spend” (Hofstede, 2005:87). One of the family-related EVS 2008 questions asked respondents to choose up to five qualities from the list of eleven³ that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Two of these qualities, “independence” and “imagination”, could be viewed as characteristics of an individualist culture, as the former prepare the child for an independent life from the family, or a group, while the second nurtures the ability to think differently, “out of the box.”

³ Good manners; Independence; Hard work; Feeling of responsibility; Imagination; Tolerance and respect for other people; Thrift, saving money and things; Determination, perseverance; Religious faith; Unselfishness; Obedience.

All three countries score equally on the account of these two indicators, with 24, 25, and 23 percent of respectively Armenian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian respondents viewing “independence” as a necessary quality to develop in children. “Imagination” appears even less popular with only 11, 9, and 12 percent of respectively Armenian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian respondents finding it important for children. The NSS countries scored over thrice on the first and second indicators (see Table 10).

Country	<i>Independence</i>	<i>Imagination</i>
Armenia	24	11
Belarus	25	9
Ukraine	23	12
NSS	72	30

^a Weighted samples.

Source: EVS 2008.

The fact that some of the family-related EVS 2008 questions had been asked approximately a decade before by World Values Survey in Ukraine (1996), Belarus (1996), and Armenia (1997) gives an opportunity to make some assumptions about the dynamics of collectivism/individualism over a short period of one decade. While the percentage of respondents in Ukraine who consider family as “very important” did not change over a decade (87 percent both in 1996 and 2008), Armenia and Belarus appear to have demonstrated slight shifts, respectively, toward the family (86 percent in 1997, and 94 in 2008), and away from it (84 percent in 1996, and 81 in 2008) (WVS 2009; EVS 2010).

While the number of Armenian and Ukrainian respondents giving preference to unconditional love and respect toward parents remained at the same level, Belarus demonstrated almost a ten percent shift toward individualism (see Table 11).

Country	<i>Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one</i>	<i>One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by</i>
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	<i>must always love and respect them</i>			<i>their behaviour and attitudes</i>		
Year	1997 ^a	2008 ^b	Change	1997 ^a	2008 ^b	Change
Armenia	93	93	0	7	7	0
Belarus	84	75	-9	16	25	+9
Ukraine	90	92	+2	10	8	-2

^a **1500-equilibrated samples.

^b Weighted samples.

Source: WVS 1996-1997, EVS 2008.

Compared with 1996-1997, in 2008 respondents in all three countries give less preference to the necessity of promoting independence in children at an early age. However, it is Belarus whose decline in individualism on this indicator seems milder (from 30 to 25 percent) compared with Ukraine (from 34 to 23 percent) and Armenia (from 32 to 24 percent). In the meantime, over a period of a decade, the popularity of “imagination” seems to have decreased in Armenia and remained the same in Belarus and Ukraine.

Collectivism/Individualism and economic growth

Economic development is considered by scholars as the most plausible predictor of a shift from collectivism to individualism. Dahrendorf, for example, holds that economic growth may extend the horizon of choice or so called “life chances” of individuals, thereby slackening collective bonds (Dahrendorf, 1979:32). Hofstede, too, makes a similar assumption (Hofstede, 2011:132). Triandis et al. state that economic growth may precede and result from individualism alike (1988:324).

Existence of a relationship between the economic standing of a country and its level of individualism should be supported by the comparison of GNI per capita. In 1996, GNI per capita in Belarus was almost twice as high as in Ukraine and thrice as high as in Armenia. By 2008, the gross income of Belarus remained almost twice as high⁴ (see Table 12).

Country	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Armenia	520	590	660	800	1150	1920	2580	3340	3040	3090

⁴ The World Bank (2011). GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$), Retrieved 14 August 2011, from: <<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD>>.

Ukraine	860	850	700	790	1270	1950	2570	3210	2840	3010
Belarus	1450	1550	1380	1370	1610	3490	4350	5550	5680	6030
NSS (mean)	36297	35520	35210	34727	46740	57447	60703	64683	66143	68457

Source: The World Bank

To further support the idea of a possible relationship between income and individualism/collectivism, independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare weekly household income of respondents in individualist and collectivist conditions (two variables, “children learn independence at home” and “unconditional love for parents,” were used to define these conditions). According to the test results, there seems to be a difference in the scores for individualist and collectivist conditions in the countries at the issue.

For example, the tables below (see Table 13, Table 14) demonstrate that the weekly household income of respondents with individualistic preferences (those thinking that independence should be encouraged in children or that parents should earn the love and respect of children) is higher than that of respondents with collectivist preferences, in majority of the cases the difference being statistically significant.

Table 13. T-test: Weekly household income / Important qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home: Independence (EVS 2010)

Country	Individualist	Collectivist	t	p
Armenia	M=1.81, SD=1.03	M=1.75, SD=0.95	1.05	.292
Belarus	M=2.90, SD=1.46	M=2.63, SD=1.23	3.25	.001
Ukraine	M=2.41, SD=0.95	M=2.17, SD=0.99	3.46	.001
Norway	M=7.49, SD=2.03	M=6.89, SD=2.09	3.20	.001
Sweden	M=7.60, SD=2.06	M=7.30, SD=1.99	2.30	.022
Switzerland	M=8.60, SD=1.91	M=7.99, SD=2.19	4.57	.000

Table 14. T-test: Weekly household income / Love and respect toward parents (EVS 2010)

Country	Individualist	Collectivist	t	p
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Armenia	M=2.01, SD=1.05	M=1.74, SD=0.94	-2.77	.006
Belarus	M=2.75, SD=1.35	M=2.69, SD=1.26	-.703	.482
Ukraine	M=2.32, SD=0.97	M=2.21, SD=0.99	-1.09	.275
Norway	M=7.59, SD=2.01	M=7.06, SD=2.07	-3.86	.000
Sweden	M=7.72, SD=2.13	M=7.02, SD=1.94	-4.91	.000
Switzerland	M=8.74, SD=2.12	M=8.08, SD=1.83	-4.97	.000

Conclusions

1. Value change in NEE in the 1990s-2000s has been characterized by two processes: the growth of materialism and the growth of individualism caused by the breakdown of the Soviet Union and social and financial crisis that followed. This value change is specific to the region, while the global trend is that of growth of post-materialist values and individualization.
2. Economic values in new eastern Europe are at the moment similar to those in western European countries: individualist orientations in income distribution, business ownership, responsibility for the well-being, and competition have slightly gone up in NEE since the 1990s. Surprisingly, they have visibly grown in that period in western European countries as well.
3. Democratic value orientations are far from overwhelming in new eastern Europe. While generally the level of support for democracy has increased in the 1990s-2000s, support for the authoritarian power has also risen. In Ukraine, support for democracy has gone down after the 2004-2005 democratic revolution. The dominance of democratic value orientations in NEE is much smaller than in NSS. However, NEE countries demonstrate diverging value patterns in this matter.
4. Civic values that measure the strength of social norms have become higher in NEE countries and have partly levelled off with western European countries. Cheating on society in taxes, bribery, or in other ways has become much less justified in NEE during the 1990s-2000s. However, in Belarus civic morals have deteriorated, which has to do with political regime and low transparency of institutions.
5. Private morals including attitudes to divorce, abortion, and homosexuality are much more restrictive in new eastern Europe than in western European countries. While in the 1990s-2000s, emancipative value orientations have increased in western Europe, restrictive value orientations

have increased in NEE, especially in Armenia, which might indicate the growth of family importance in the face of social changes of post-Soviet time.

6. Changes have taken place over time in the values of self-realization, personal responsibility and initiative at work, but these values are still at the periphery of Ukrainian and Belarusian labour consciousness, and materialistic needs dominate in work in Armenia, Belarus, and Ukraine.

7. There are similarities between Armenia, Belarus, and Ukraine in the desired stability and avoidance of risk at work. On the other hand, the intrinsic values of work (initiative, responsibility, meeting new people, interest, promotion) clearly dominate in NSS, while external conditions of the job preferences (job security, good hours) dominate in Ukraine and Belarus. Armenia is close to NSS by its own estimations, but the respondents in Armenia choose most given items as preferences.

8. Analysis of data derived from family-related indicators demonstrates that Armenia, Belarus, and Ukraine are predominantly collectivist cultures. Compared with Ukraine and Armenia, Belarus scores less collectivist. Compared with the data of WVS 1996-1997, Belarus is also the country whose shift toward individualism in the course of a decade is more evident.

9. The comparison of collectivism/individualism indicators with the levels of affluence (both among and within the countries) makes it possible to argue in favour of existence of a positive relation between those concepts which corresponds to the “post-materialism thesis” about the value changes.

Appendix 1

Table A. *Opinions about work ethos across four countries (EVS, 2008)*

■ - strongly agree
 ■ - agree
 ■ - neither agree nor disagree
 ■ - disagree
 ■ - strongly disagree

To fully develop your talents you need to have a job






It's humiliating to receive money without having to work for it

People who don't work turn lazy






Work is a duty towards society

Work should always come first even if it means less spare time






Armenia








Belarus








Ukraine








Norway



Sweden



Switzerland



Weighted samples

p<0.01

Glossary

Collectivism pertains to societies in which people from birth onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people's lifetimes continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty" (Hofstede 2005:76).

Individualism is linked to "doing what is satisfying in terms of personal goals; behavior regulated by the individual", "self as distinct entity from in-group", and "self-reliance and emotional distance from the in-group" (Triandis 1988:329).

Individualization – the process when the individual increasingly becomes the point of reference in people's shaping of own values and attitudes.

Inglehart's theory of modernization – Inglehart's "post-materialism thesis" suggests that when basic economic and security needs have been met in societies experiencing industrialization, value preferences defined by survival and material needs are followed by post-materialist value preferences, which primarily concern self-expression and mental well-being (Inglehart, 1997:104)

Value change – the process of value system restructuring, when some values shift to the value core and other descend into the value periphery; old values diminish and new values appear. Under normal conditions, the process spans over one-two generations to complete.

Value orientations are practical motivations that guide people's opinion about different situations. E.g., while "work" is a value, beliefs that a good work should be well-paid or should involve meeting new people, are value orientations. values are exactly what people hold as important in their lives such as "family", or "work", or "religion". In practical issues we talk about "value orientations", i.e. what people would like to have around them if they could choose. Values orientations also indicate what social changes people would accept and what not. This is especially important to know when we try to interpret people's behaviour.

Values are guiding ideas about a desirable state of life that carry strong personal and/or social meaning to people as they get interiorized within the track of socialization. People choose between different social goals, attitudes, and patterns as prior to them and pursue them in their behaviour (Lobanova & Chutova, 2009).

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Recommended Reading to the Chapter

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Relevant links and sources

- *European Values Study (EVS)* - <http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/>
- *World Value Survey (WVS)* - <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>; www.wvsevsdb.com
- *The World Bank* - <http://data.worldbank.org> ; <http://web.worldbank.org>
- *International Labour Organization* - <http://laborsta.ilo.org>
- *World Divorce Statistics* - <http://www.divorcemag.com/statistics/statsWorld.shtml>
- *Health Statistics by Country* - <http://www.nationmaster.com/cat/hea-health>

About the Module

This module deals with the values in new eastern Europe and trends of value change that has taken place in the 1990-2000s. To provide a background for comparison, the data from Armenia, Belarus, and Ukraine, three NEE countries, and Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, three highly individualized countries are put together and contrasted. The data covered include value change in economy, political attitudes, civic and private moral values, work and work ethos, and family.

This module is suitable both as an information resource on the value change in NEE countries in the 1990-2000s, and as a short theoretical introduction into the theory of value change.

The module includes tasks on:

- a) Comparison and analysis of data in tables
- b) Reading and analyzing spider-maps and pie charts
- c) Understanding and interpretation of social indicators.
- d) Presentation of structured arguments in a discussion.
- e) Group work.

As a source of comparative data, the module can be used for undergraduate students of the social sciences and humanities including sociology, political science, history, European studies, and others.

Additionally, the module includes a range of tasks for sociology students familiar with factor analysis (a step-by-step instruction for SPSS is provided).

After learning this module, the students can be expected to:

- a) Distinguish between the concepts of "value", "value change", "value orientations", and different types of values.
- b) Be aware of a variety of value models in social theory.
- c) Name and characterize the major trends of value change in NEE in the 1990-2000s.

- d) Indicate the common and specific features of value change in NEE across different spheres of life.
- e) Compare and contrast the trends of value change in NEE and western European countries in the 1990-2000s across various indicators.

The module can take up to 4 separate classes. The group work is proposed for a group of 12-20 students.

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